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The Tension between Derivative Works Online 
Protected by Fair Use and the Takedown 
Provisions of the Online Copyright Infringement 
Liability Limitation Act 
By Frank Guzman* 
The globalization and increasing ease of Internet access allow more people to share 
content than ever before. A substantial amount of this content relates to another’s 
copyrighted material, whether it is infringing content such as piracy or noninfringing 
content such as commentaries, criticisms, parodies, or other material falling under fair 
use. Due in part to piracy concerns, the Online Copyright Infringement Liability 
Limitation Act (OCILLA) created a process meant to expedite removal of infringing 
content hosted on the Internet. However, this takedown process has been used to remove 
noninfringing content that uses another’s copyright material, but falling under fair use. 
This usage of the takedown process is enabled by the requirement that the original 
copyright owner only needs a good faith belief that the target’s use is not authorized, and 
by the nature of fair use determination—the consideration of various factors—which 
makes determinations of individual works difficult. Due to this difficulty, copyright 
owners are able to easily meet the good faith standard, endangering fair use speech on 
the Internet. Therefore OCILLA needs to change in order to decrease the chilling effect 
on this type of speech. 
Proposals have been made to ameliorate this situation. However, most of them overreach 
and impede copyright owners from expeditious removal of clearly infringing material, 
contrary to the purpose of OCILLA. This comment suggests a different solution: creation 
of safe harbor provisions where certain narrow categories of content are irrebuttably 
presumed to be fair use. Though this solution does not alleviate the problem on fair use 
content in general, it allows for greater certainty to people who want to create content 
based on another’s work while qualifying as fair use, without obstructing copyright 
owners from protecting their works through removing infringing material. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1  The ubiquitous use of the Internet has allowed users to find people with similar 
shared interests, in increasingly larger numbers, and with greater ease. This widespread 
adoption of the Internet has led to an upsurge in the amount of ease in which users can 
share the content that they create themselves. When the subject matter of such content is 
itself protected by copyright, this user-shared content might appropriate that copyrighted 
material. A substantial amount of such content constitutes derivative works,1 usually 
created without permission of the copyright owner.2 Derivative works can be divided into 
two categories: transformative3 and non-transformative (though these categories operate in 
a continuum based on their level of transformation).4 The legal status of transformative 
work is of special importance to users who create or enjoy work based off other works.5 
Usually such users are fans of the original work, which itself is almost always protected by 
copyright.6 
 
1 "A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A 
work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.'" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
2 A copyright owner has the exclusive right "to prepare derivate works based upon the copyrighted 
work" and to authorize another to do so, subject to other sections of the United States Code. Id. § 106. 
3 A transformative work is a work created through transformative use of copyrighted material. 
Transformative use is "[t]he use of copyrighted material in a manner, or for a purpose, that differs from the 
original use in such a way that the expression, meaning, or message is essentially new." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1637 (9th ed. 2009). 
4 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), for an example of a court treating 
transformation on a continuum. 
5 Examples of the ways that the original work are incorporated into new works include when written 
stories, images, songs, or videos use the characters or settings of a story expressed by that original work. 
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) ("Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression . . . ."). 
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¶2  With the success of content hosting sites7 like YouTube,8 the impact of the Online 
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA)9 is entering the public 
consciousness in a progressively greater fashion. As these sites host more infringing 
content, the owners increasingly seek to protect their copyrights by having such content 
removed from the sites. The most widely used method for removal is sending a takedown 
notice to the content host that includes all the information that OCILLA requires,10 to 
which the hosting service must respond to by immediate removal of the allegedly infringing 
content in order to be shielded from liability for hosting that content.11 However, it is not 
always straightforward to determine whether a single piece of content is infringed.  
¶3  One of the broadest exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright owners is the fair 
use doctrine.12 Fair use is determined through four statutory factors,13 so no bright-line rule 
exists. This is aggravated by the fact-based nature of each case, which prohibits broad 
instruction. Therefore, many derivative works, which fall under ‘fair use,’ are targets of 
takedown notices. 
¶4  OCILLA only requires that the takedown notice and the subsequent removal of the 
allegedly infringed content be done in good faith.14 Given the ambiguous nature of the 
doctrine of fair use, owners have little incentive to give the benefit of the doubt to users 
who assert the fair use defense—unless it is indisputable)—because 1) owners derive 
almost no direct benefit from the existence of the derivative content, 2) giving the benefit 
of the doubt may lead to permitting infringing content to remain online, and 3) lastly, 
determining fair use takes time. This perceived lack of benefit may lead those owners of 
the original work to believe that a derivate work, even though protected by fair use, is still 
practically infringing nonetheless. This inevitably leads to some users losing their hard-
earned work that they have invested time (and sometimes money) into, with little recourse.  
¶5  There are many proposals advanced that attempt to correct this problem. However, 
most are overstretched and allow the infringer to claim fair use in order to delay the removal 
of the infringing content, prolonging the harm to the copyright owner. Other proposals 
disincentivize copyright owners and hosting services from finding and removing infringed 
contents, thereby conflicting with the purpose of OCILLA.15   
¶6  A better solution is to establish safe harbor provisions for derivative works, which 
would provide explicit rules to create non-infringing material. This would allow greater 
clarity and protection for certain classes of content without interfering with the ability of 
original copyright owners to go after infringed works. This also incorporates the benefits 
 
7 Content hosting sites are websites where one of the website's purposes is to host content created by the 
website’s users on the website’s servers, usually for public access.  
8 YouTube is the most widely used video hosting site, with more than one billion users, hundreds of 
millions hours of video watched every day, and three hundred hours of video uploaded every minute. 
Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited Feb 18, 2015). 
9 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
10 Id. § 512(c)(3). 
11 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
12 Id. § 107. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. § 512(c)(3)(v). 
15 "[The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act] preserves strong incentives for service 
providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place 
in the digital networked environment." H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), at 49 (1998). 
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of the approach that most international communities use to limit the exclusive right of 
copyright owners—delineating explicit cases that fall outside such rights of the owner.16 
¶7  Part II of this comment will focus on the takedown provisions of OCILLA and its 
background. Part III will provide an overview of the current doctrine of fair use. Part IV 
will discuss the effects of takedown provisions on derivative works that are protected by 
fair use. Part V will briefly discuss international alternatives to fair use as well as 
international reactions to proliferation of derivative works posted by online users. Part VI 
will talk about solutions to this issue advanced by others, and Part VII will advance the 
idea of introducing safe harbor provisions for some classes of such work. 
¶8  This comment will not cover possible concerns involving the First Amendment’s 
freedom of speech and the current application of the OCILLA takedown provisions,17 nor 
will it cover the effects of takedown notices on non-infringing content other than derivative 
works covered by fair use.18 
II. THE TAKEDOWN PROVISIONS OF THE ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY 
LIMITATION ACT 
¶9  The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), codified at 
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012), was passed as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) on October 28, 1998.19 OCILLA was created in response to the controversy 
regarding "[t]he liability of on-line service providers and Internet access providers for 
copyright infringements that take place in the on-line environment."20 The purpose of the 
act was to encourage cooperation between copyright owners and service providers in 
combating copyright infringement on the internet while "provid[ing] greater certainty to 
service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the 
course of their activities."21 
¶10  OCILLA provides a procedure for copyright owners to deal with infringing content 
hosted by service providers. This process allows copyright owners to notify service 
providers of infringing content. The service provider responds to the notice by removing 
the content in order to limit the liability that it may have for hosting the infringing 
material.22 
¶11  To begin the process, the copyright owner23 sends a takedown notice24 to the service 
 
16 For examples of these delineations, see Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 40-47J (Austl.); Sections 41-92E 
of the Copyright Act 1994 (N.Z.). 
17 For an article focusing on this aspect, see Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe 
Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010). 
18 For an article regarding the effects on works under public domain, see John Tehranian, Curbing 
Copyblight, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993 (2012). 
19 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
20 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), at 49 (1998). 
21 Id. at 49-50. 
22 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
23 This need not be the owner personally, but may also be someone who is authorized to act on behalf of 
the owner. Subsequent references to the copyright owner in regards to the takedown provisions imply this. 
See id. § 512(c)(vi). 
24 A takedown notice is a written notification to a service provider of infringing material stored on the 
provider’s system or network, specifically a notification that conforms to § 512(c)(3)(A). 
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provider containing, among other things,25 information identifying the allegedly infringed 
content.26 The owner need only a good faith belief that the use of its copyright is not 
authorized in order to send a takedown notice.27 Once the service provider receives the 
takedown notice, it must act expeditiously to remove or prevent access to the allegedly 
infringing material.28 
¶12  The person who posted the content may then attempt to have it restored by sending 
a counter notification to the service provider.29 This counter notification must contain, 
among other things,30 "[a] statement under penalty of perjury that [he] has a good faith 
belief that the material was removed or disabled as a result of mistake or misidentification 
of the material to be removed or disabled."31 Once the service provider receives the counter 
notification, the service provider delivers to the copyright owner a copy of the counter 
notification and informs the owner that the service provider will restore the content in ten 
business days.32 After ten to fourteen business days, the service provider restores the 
allegedly infringing content, unless it receives notice first that the copyright owner filed an 
action asking the court to prohibit the user from "engaging in infringing activity relating to 
the material on the service provider's system or network."33 
¶13  One additional subsection of OCILLA comes into play if parties base either their 
takedown notice or their counter notification on misrepresentation.34 Section 512(f) was 
added to discourage parties from knowingly make such misrepresentations due to the harm 
that they would cause to all parties involved: copyright owners, service providers, and 
Internet users.35 It creates a cause of action against a party who "knowingly materially 
misrepresents"36 that either the content is infringing37 or that it "was removed or disabled 
by mistake or misidentification."38 
III. FAIR USE 
¶14  Fair use is a limitation to the copyright owners’ exclusive rights39 over copyrighted 
 
25 See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(vi), for a full list of the requirements that the takedown notice must include. 
26 See id. § 512(c)(3)(A). 
27 See id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v); see also id. § 512(f)(1). The good faith belief is judged by a subjective 
standard, not an objective one. See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
28 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
29 Id. § 512(g). 
30 See id. § 512(g)(3)(A)-(D), for a full list of the requirements that the counter notification must 
include. 
31 Id. § 512(g)(3)(D). 
32 Id. § 512(g)(2)(B). 
33 Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
34 Id. § 512(f). 
35 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), at 59 (1998) (referred to as § 512(e)). 
36 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). Though this language has yet to be interpreted by any federal appellate court, at 
least one district court has read the language to include "[a] good faith consideration of whether a particular 
use is fair use." Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
37 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)(1). 
38 Id. § 512(f)(2). 
39 The list of exclusive rights that a copyright owner has is listed in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
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works.40 Current fair use analysis has its roots in Folsom v. Marsh,41 and, codified by the 
Copyright Act of 1976.42 "Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact."43 To determine 
whether the appropriation of a copyrighted work falls under fair use, four factors are 
considered: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.44 
¶15  The first factor requires determination of whether the new work just takes the place 
of the original or it instead transforms that original work, "add[ing] something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message."45 Transformative use is not necessary for a work to fall under fair use, but a 
more transformative work would make the other factors weigh less in the fair use 
analysis.46 "[T]he commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a work is only one 
element of the first factor enquiry into its purpose and character."47 
¶16  The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, "calls for recognition that 
some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the 
consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied."48 
Elements to consider include whether the original work is unpublished49 and whether it is 
a "creative expression for public dissemination."50 
¶17  For the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used, the analysis 
focuses on "the persuasiveness of [the] justification for the particular copying done."51 Part 
of the determination depends on the first factor, since "the extent of permissible copying 
varies with the purpose and character of the use."52 This factor also overlaps with the fourth 
since the amount taken and the significance of that portion helps determine "the degree to 
which the [work] may serve as a market substitute for the original or potentially licensed 
derivatives."53 
 
40 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
41 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
42 Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 
101-810 (2012)). 
43 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
44 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
45 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 584. 
48 Id. at 586. 
49 "[T]he scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works." Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (discussing the weight of the right of first publication 
against actions that may otherwise fall under fair use). 
50 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 586-87. 
53 Id. at 587. 
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¶18  The fourth factor, the effect of the use on the potential market for the copyrighted 
work, "is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."54 It requires 
consideration of the magnitude of harm to the original work, not just the harm caused by 
the particular alleged infringing work, but also the impact of similar uses if they were to 
become pervasive and allowed to be unabated.55 "Fair use, when properly applied, is 
limited to copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of the work 
which is copied."56 The analysis of market harm must include the level of impairment 
regarding the market for the exclusive rights of the owner, including the market for 
derivative works.57 "[T]o negate fair use one need only show that if the challenged use 
'should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the 
copyrighted work.'"58 However, there is a difference between market harm caused by 
displacement, which copyright law is meant to protect against, and harm caused by 
criticism, which is not a protectable part of the market for derivative works.59 "[T]he only 
harm to derivatives that need concern us . . . is the harm of market substitution."60 
¶19  Even after going through the analysis above, a determination based on the four 
factors alone is not enough. "The factors enumerated in the section are not meant to be 
exclusive: '[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable 
definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on its own 
facts.'"61 Moreover, no single factor is dispositive in the question of fair use.62 Therefore, 
the doctrine of fair use remains complex and clouded, allowing for little certainty on 
whether any classification of content falls under fair use or not.63 
IV. EFFECTS OF THE TAKEDOWN PROVISIONS OF THE ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
LIABILITY LIMITATION ACT ON DERIVATIVE WORKS PROTECTED BY FAIR USE 
¶20  The takedown provisions of the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation 
Act (OCILLA) have had an inadvertent effect when the user who uploaded the allegedly 
infringing material asserts fair use. The factor-based approach used to determine fair use64 
lacks clarity and fails to draw the contours. This problem is exacerbated when neither party 
has any training or experience in fair use doctrine, making such determination at best 
guesswork or at worse completely biased to their own position. 
 
54 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 566. 
55 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
56 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 566-67 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10[D], at 1-87 (1993)). 
57 Id. at 568. 
58 Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). 
59 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. 
60 Id. at 593. 
61 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 560 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 65 (1976)). 
62 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584. 
63 The examples of fair use listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) are not meant to be per se categories of fair 
use. "[W]hether a use referred to in the first sentence of section 107 is a fair use in a particular case will 
depend upon the application of the determinative factors, including those mentioned in the second 
sentence." Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 561 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975)). 
64 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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¶21  OCILLA’s language intended to curb abuse of the takedown notice process 
aggravates the problem. For instance, OCILLA requires that all takedown notices include 
"[a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in 
the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law."65 
The good faith belief has been interpreted with a subjective standard.66 This standard 
allows the copyright owner to take advantage of the lack of bright-line rules in the 
determination of fair use by always presuming that the content is not protected by fair use 
unless it is facially obvious. In fact, the question of whether good faith requires the 
consideration of the applicability of fair use was not addressed by any court until ten years 
after the passage of OCILLA in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.67 In Lenz, the copyright 
owner expressed its view to the court as such:  
Universal suggests that copyright owners may lose the ability to respond rapidly 
to potential infringements if they are required to evaluate fair use prior to issuing 
takedown notices. Universal also points out that the question of whether a 
particular use of copyrighted material constitutes fair use is a fact-intensive 
inquiry, and that it is difficult for copyright owners to predict whether a court 
eventually may rule in their favor.68 
¶22  The court responded by saying that Universal overstated the actual impact of 
requiring fair use evaluation.69 However, the court acknowledged that "there are likely to 
be few [cases] in which a copyright owner's determination that a particular use is not fair 
use will meet the requisite standard of subjective bad faith required to prevail in an action 
for misrepresentation under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)."70 This implies that while copyright 
owners must consider fair use before sending a takedown notice, their fair use 
consideration need not be completely thorough, thus leaving the overall dilemma largely 
unresolved.71 
¶23  The requirement to consider fair use in good faith allows 17 U.S.C. § 512(f)72 to 
serve as a possible remedy for a user whose work was removed or disabled due to a 
takedown notice from the copyright owner. However, the standard for determining whether 
the owner knowingly materially misrepresents is if the owner "did not possess a subjective 
good faith belief that its copyright was being infringed."73 This places the burden on the 
user in proving that the owner knowingly misrepresented that the allegedly infringing 
 
65 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
66 Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2004). 
67 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
68 Id. at 1155. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Not all courts have agreed that copyright owners must explore the possibility of fair use before 
sending a takedown notice in order to show good faith. See Tuteur v. Crosley-Corcoran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 
333 (D. Mass. 2013). 
72 "Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents . . . that material or activity is infringing . . . 
shall be liable for any damages . . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012). 
73 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff'd, 628 F.3d 1175 
(9th Cir. 2011). See also Dudnikov v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1012 (D. Colo. 2005) 
("Thus, as long as [the copyright owner] acted in good faith belief that infringement was occurring, there is 
no cause of action under § 512(f)."). 
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content does not fall under fair use, thus setting a high bar which limits the usefulness of § 
512(f). 
¶24  Given the limited power that § 512(f) affords to users whose content is removed, the 
copyright owners are largely unchallenged. This promotes an aggressive stance against any 
use of copyrighted material, whether or not it falls under fair use. One of the upsides is that 
this reduces the harm from the infringing activities on the owners since the owners can 
respond to infringement of their material quickly, as they need only perform minimal 
investigation into infringement. However, one downside is that this creates a significant 
amount of collateral damage by also encompassing material whose use of the copyrighted 
content may fall under fair use. This inequity is contrary to one of the purposes of OCILLA, 
namely that it fails to "balance the need for rapid response to potential infringement with 
the end-users legitimate interests in not having material removed without recourse."74 
¶25  Compounding this problem is the role of the service providers that host the content 
alleged to be infringing. Since one of the goals of OCILLA was to have the service 
providers cooperate with the copyright owners "to detect and deal with copyright 
infringements,"75 OCILLA provides strong incentives for service providers to comply with 
any takedown notice they receive by having provisions which limit the liability they have 
for hosting the possibly infringing content.76 Such limitation on their liability is contingent 
on their expeditious removal or disabling of that content.77 Furthermore, the service 
providers are shielded from liability arising from the good faith disabling or removing the 
allegedly infringing material.78 Consequently, the providers have no incentive to act as 
gatekeepers by ignoring abusive takedown notices. In fact, any action toward that end could 
open the floodgates of litigation from copyright owners, which would be costly to the 
service providers and would prevent service providers from responding to takedown 
requests expeditiously, given the amount of resources it would take to scrutinize each 
notice. 
¶26  Those users whose derivative works fall under fair use may feel that they have no 
practical way of fighting back against the overzealous use of takedown notices. Like the 
copyright owners, the large grey area concerning the factor-based nature of fair use 
determination leaves a lot of uncertainty as to whether their content is actually within fair 
use. Many of those users have no experience and training in copyright law, and they cannot 
or choose not to spend money for a lawyer. Because much of this content is 
noncommercial, the users do not have a financial stake in the matter. Therefore, most users 
err on the side of caution and abandon any attempt to resist the removal or disabling of 
their material. Even if those users want to assert their rights, most find the threat of 
litigation too daunting. 
¶27  Users also face a massive disadvantage in terms of procedure. If they file a counter 
notification in response to the takedown request, the service provider must wait at least ten 
business days before restoring the content.79 That time interval may deprive the content of 
 
74 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998). 
75 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), at 49 (1998). 
76 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). 
77 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C). 
78 Id. § 512(g)(1). 
79 Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). 
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any real value if the value of the content depends on quick distribution.80 A counter 
notification may also lead the copyright owner to file a suit against the user.81 An attempt 
to deal with the copyright owners directly through a § 512(f)82 cause of action would 
require users to pass the high bar set by the subjective good faith standard, which is nearly 
impossible given the uncertain state of fair use. The users have virtually no other causes of 
action based on the same claim because § 512(f) preempts state law claims.83 Even if users 
believed they would be successful in such a suit, litigation would be too costly and consume 
too much time for most users. 
¶28  The current framework regarding the takedown process has another effect on the 
users beyond the actions of the copyright owners. The apprehension that users have of 
fighting back against any takedown notices against them, coupled with the lack of scrutiny 
that service providers give to the notices, allows individuals to impersonate84 copyright 
owners by filing false takedown notices without any repercussions. The ability of 
individuals to abuse the process to remove content that the users had a right to express is 
of grave concern, but a thorough analysis and discussion of possible remedies is beyond 
the scope of this comment. 
V. INTERNATIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO FAIR USE AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO 
USER-GENERATED CONTENT 
¶29  The Internet is a global medium, allowing communication on an international scale.  
This creates tension between copyright holders and those who legally appropriate their 
work, and is not uniquely American. However, America is fairly unique in the vagueness 
of its fair use doctrine.85 For most other countries, the law carves out specific exceptions 
to copyright holder rights. 
¶30  One hundred sixty-seven nations, including the United States, are currently parties 
to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.86 The treaty 
provides "[i]t shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
 
80 One example of such content would be breaking news, since most of the value comes from reporting 
about the events as it unfolds. 
81 If the copyright owners "file[] an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging 
in infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider's system or network," then the provider 
does not have to restore the allegedly infringing material within the ten to fourteen business day period. Id. 
§ 512(g)(2)(C). 
82 Id. § 512(f). 
83 Amaretto Ranch Breedables, LLC v. Ozimals, Inc., No. C 10-05696 CRB, 2011 WL 2690437, at *3-5 
(N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011). 
84 Either through forging the copyright owner's information or by claiming that they own the purported 
copyright. 
85 The Philippines has a concept of fair use with statutory language that is similar to that found in 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2012). See An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the 
Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 
8293, § 185 (June 6, 1997) (Phil.), available at http://www.gov.ph/1997/06/06/republic-act-no-8293/. Israel 
recently also added fair use in its statute with wording similar to that of 17 U.S.C. § 107. See Israel 
Copyright Act, 5768-2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 19 (2007). 
86 Contracting Parties to the Berne Convention, WIPO – WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION, 13 (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/berne.pdf. 
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reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the author."87 Most countries use this “special cases” approach. 
¶31  For example, the European Union enacted a directive88 regarding copyright that 
included a list of exceptions to the rights of copyright owners.89 The list itself is limited to 
"certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other 
subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right-
holder."90 Though this limitation operates on the list of exceptions, the exceptions on the 
list (particularly Article 5(3)) give a good idea on the type of cases that most people feel 
should not be within the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. 
¶32  The approach of delineating content that falls within fair dealing gives greater clarity 
than the factor-based approach of fair use in the United States. However, its under-inclusive 
and reactive nature requires changing the law to include new content to protect. 
¶33  One type of content that has appeared recently is a type of derivative work 
popularized by the Internet: user-generated content (UGC). The term UGC does not have 
a generally accepted definition,91 but it has been described as "material uploaded to the 
Internet by website users"92 and as "content that is 'voluntarily developed by an individual 
or a consortium and distributed through an online platform.'"93 Therefore, UGC may be 
subject to OCILLA takedown notices from copyright owners. 
¶34  The surge in UGC has led some countries to move to amend their copyright laws to 
have such content considered noninfringing, as most UGC do not fall under any preexisting 
categorical exceptions to the rights of copyright owners.94 One country has recently passed 
legislation specific to this matter. In 2012, Canada amended its Copyright Act to add a new 
section specifically on the subject of UGC, which states that content incorporating existing 
publicly disseminated works are not infringing if it meets four criteria:  
1. it is solely done for non-commercial purposes,  
2. the source of the original work is mentioned (if reasonable to do so),  
3. the person creating the content has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
original work is not infringing any copyrights,  
4. and such use does not significantly negatively impact current or potential 
exploitation of the original work or the market for it.95  
 
87 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
88 A directive is a binding act, which requires member states to achieve a particular result. See 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, May 9, 2008, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 174. 
89 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, On the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167/10) [hereinafter Directive 2001/29/EC]. 
90 Id. art. 17. 
91 Len Glickman & Jessica Fingerhut, User-Generated Content: Recent Developments in Canada and 
the United States, 30 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3 (2012). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 3 n.2 (quoting SAMUEL E. TROSOW ET AL., MOBILIZING USER-GENERATED CONTENT FOR 
CANADA'S DIGITAL ADVANTAGE 10 (2010)). 
94 See, e.g., Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 89. 
95 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 29.21(1), amended by S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.). 
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¶35  Though this statute is not clear-cut on which specific uses are noninfringing, it 
provides more clarity than fair use doctrine in the United States, while also being broad 
enough to encapsulate most of the activity that the legislators sought to protect. 
¶36  Canada is not the only body working on welcoming the advent of UGC. The 
European Commission, as part of its effort to modernize the European Union's copyright 
framework in response to the growth in the importance of the digital environment, initiated 
stakeholder dialog on four issues, one of which it calls "User-Generated Content and 
Licensing for Small-Scale Users of Protected Material."96 The Commission's purpose in 
raising this issue is "to foster transparency and ensure that end-users have greater clarity 
on uses of protected material."97 However, the group set up to address this issue was unable 
to reach a consensus on how to handle the issue or even how to define UGC.98 
Nevertheless, groups raised various ways to approach this phenomenon.99 One approach 
was to create "a new exception . . . to cover UGC, in particular non-commercial activities 
by individuals such as combining existing musical works with videos, sequences of photos, 
etc."100 Another approach was to avoid any changes in the law since licenses are 
increasingly becoming more readily available, both between the copyright owners and the 
service providers and between the owners and the users creating the content.101 At the time 
this comment was written, the European Commission allowed the public to comment on 
this matter through answering questions listed on its consultation document.102 
¶37  Though the United States is nearly alone in its broad, vague fair use doctrine, most 
countries recognize that there should exist some degree of limitation to copyrights.103 Many 
of those other countries approach the issue with specific rules rather than a broad, 
all-encompassing standard, which allows for greater certainty in determining whether a 
given use is infringing.104 User-generated content, which includes many online derivative 
works that fall under fair use in the United States, is starting to be addressed in the global 
community as UGC becomes more prevalent on the Internet. Canada's response to the rise 
of UGC and the European Union's grappling with this new class of content may help 
provide solutions on how to deal with the problem of the ambiguous nature of fair use here 
in the United States as applied to such content. 
 
96 Press Release, European Commission, Copyright: Commission Urges Industry to Deliver Innovative 
Solutions for Greater Access to Online Content, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-
1394_en.htm. 
97 Id. 
98 Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 29, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/consultation-document_en.pdf 




102 Id. at 2-3. 
103 One such limitation regarding quoting publicized works is explicitly stated in the Berne Convention. 
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 10(1), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised 
at Paris July 24, 1971 as amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
104 For examples of other countries’ approaches, see Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 40-47J (Austl.); 
Sections 41-92E of Copyright Act 1994 (N.Z.). 
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VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO TAKEDOWN ABUSES 
¶38  The misuse of the current OCILLA framework by copyright owners by abusing the 
takedown system has become increasingly visible to a growing number of people. Faced 
with this growing problem, a number of potential solutions have been advanced. This 
section will briefly discuss several solutions advanced by others. 
¶39  One solution, advanced in a note by Jeffrey Cobia, is to have all takedown notices 
first examined by the U.S. Copyright Office.105 His solution is to establish a new branch in 
the Copyright Office that would examine each takedown notice for two things: "1) whether 
the takedown notice originated from the same entity that holds the valid, registered 
copyright, and 2) whether the use was fair use."106 This solution allows for the neutral 
determination on the validity of each takedown notice, thereby reducing the amount of 
content protected by fair use that is removed by service providers in response to takedown 
notices. This solution also has the benefit of checking the validity of each notice against 
the possibility of impersonation by the individual that sent the notice. However, the 
downsides to this plan vastly outweigh the upsides. First, a new branch and staffing for it 
would require funding by the federal government. Second, the solution proposed here, if 
implemented, would cause a backlog that would cripple the branch no matter how large. 
For example, in January 2015, Google received over 33.5 million takedown requests that 
month just for links on its search engine.107 Any considerable delay in processing takedown 
notices would allow infringing activity to persist in the interim, causing harm to the 
copyright owners. Third, this solution enormously underestimates the skill required for fair 
use analysis. Determining fair use is a heavily fact-based process, and many categories of 
content have yet to be considered by any court whether they fall under fair use or not. If 
copyright attorneys could reasonably differ on the application of fair use on a given set of 
facts, then no amount of training would lead to consistent results that would be upheld by 
courts. 
¶40  Another solution, proposed in a note by Patrick McKay, is to have the takedown 
process unavailable for non-commercial transformative works.108 His proposal, tailored for 
the protection of "fan-made derivative works,"109 is for "Congress [to] enact legislation 
specifying that the DMCA takedown process may not be used against non-commercial, 
transformative works. If a copyright owner is determined to have a non-commercial 
derivative work taken down, they should be required to either contact the creator directly 
or sue for an injunction, in which case, they would be required to justify suppressing that 
 
105 Jeffrey Cobia, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure: Misuses, 
Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 387 (2009). His two other proposed 
solutions will not be discussed here, as the existence of 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012) already plays a similar 
role to his cause of action solution, and Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) may render his last solution superfluous if supported by other courts. 
106 Cobia, supra note 105, at 404. 
107 Copyright Removal Requests, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/ (last updated Apr. 18, 2015). 
 
108 Patrick McKay, Note, Culture of the Future: Adapting Copyright Law to Accommodate Fan-Made 
Derivative Works in the Twenty-First Century, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 117 (2011). His other proposed 
solutions will not be discussed here. 
109 Id. at 141. 
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creative expression before a court."110 The benefit that this solution has is that it affords 
greater protection to fan-made works, which does concern a significant segment of internet 
users. Narrowly tailoring this solution allows copyright owners to continue to go after most 
of the piracy of their content. However, this proposal also has many substantial detriments. 
Despite his assurance that "[t]his would in no way impair copyright holders' ability to use 
the DMCA takedown process for blatantly infringing direct copies of their work,"111 it 
incentivizes infringers to minimally transform their work just enough to fall under this 
exception. His solution for copyright owners that want to go after such infringing content 
is for them "to either contact the creator directly or sue for an injunction,"112 but this is 
inadequate if the amount of infringing content exceeds the resources that the owner has to 
deal with such infringement. His solution is also faulty because it requires a binary standard 
to examine the degree of transformation as opposed to the sliding scale commonly applied 
by courts.113 If the standard is one that would be sufficient to fulfill the standard of fair use 
(assuming one exists), then the problems of copyright owners determining fair use would 
instead become a problem of determining sufficient transformation, with them continuing 
to err in the side of insufficiency. The assumption that such a standard exists would run 
against current fair use doctrine. The four factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107 must all be considered, 
and even that is not an exhaustive list.114 Also, it is the fourth factor that "is undoubtedly 
the single most important element of fair use."115 
¶41  There are numerous other solutions that are advanced, but most face the same two 
basic problems: the solution impedes on the ability of copyright owners to deal with 
infringing content on the Internet, and the solution underappreciates the fact-based nature 
of fair use analysis. Ignoring or minimizing the first problem is untenable because it lies in 
the purpose of the passage of OCILLA116 and because courts, in determining the existence 
of fair use, have shown great concern towards the possible harm to the copyright owner 
that the allegedly infringing content may cause.117 
VII. ALTERNATE SOLUTION: INTRODUCTION OF SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS 
¶42  One solution would be to establish safe harbor provisions where any complying 
content would create a categorical determination118 of fair use. Naturally, such provisions 
would be under-inclusive, but would provide certainty to interested users.  This would also 
provide the additional benefit of affording greater protection against takedown notices on 





113 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
114 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) ("The factors 
enumerated in the section are not meant to be exclusive."). 
115 Id. at 566. 
116 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II), at 49-50 (1998). 
117 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 566-68; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 590 (1994). 
118 This determination is meant to exist in any claim of infringement advanced by the copyright owner, 
but Congress may limit it to only under OCILLA. The latter would still help alleviate the problem of 
takedown notice abuses, but would create two different standards in fair use determination. 
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fair use, copyright owners cannot claim good-faith basis for any notice sent (giving greater 
certainty to a 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) action against the owner). Though the protections that this 
solution provides are narrow, it would have the benefit of establishing fair use rules where, 
besides the scant case law, there are currently none. 
¶43  This solution is also in accord with the purpose of OCILLA (and the DMCA as a 
whole) because it does not impair the ability of copyright owners to protect their interests 
against infringing activity. In fact, it goes further by helping "balance the need for rapid 
response to potential infringement with the end-users legitimate interests in not having 
material removed without recourse"119 by defining when the interests are legitimate 
without interfering in the rapid response to potential infringement. 
¶44  The particulars of the safe harbor provisions must be carefully crafted to prevent 
previously infringing activity from becoming fair use when the provisions are passed. The 
purpose of these provisions is not to widen the scope of fair use, but to give certainty to 
specific categories of content that fall well within fair use. While the precise language of 
such provisions should be crafted by those most familiar with this area of law, a few 
thoughts are presented below to give an idea if where such work could begin. 
¶45  One such provision could address commentary and criticism, recognized to be 
largely within fair use,120 that appropriates portions of the original work through the use of 
clips to run concurrently with commentary. The provision could allow such a work to fall 
within the safe harbor if its use of the original material satisfies certain criteria. For 
instance, if each clip is composed of no more than ten seconds of continuous footage from 
the original work, and the commentary as a whole uses no more than half of the footage 
from the original work in total. Among other benefits, such a provision would allow the 
copyright holder to argue that more material than necessary was taken to comment or 
criticize the work. 
¶46  Another provision could deal with the "fan-made derivative works" that McKay 
seeks to protect in his proposal.121 As mentioned in the introduction to this comment, 
transformative works made by fans have a special prominence on the Internet. Two of the 
most notable types are fan fiction122 and fan art.123 A provision to preserve them might 
cover written text and visual images that are strictly noncommercial, where the use of the 
original work's characters and setting are unrestricted but does not reproduce the original 
story or an image from the original work. The degree of similarity required to be a 
reproduction should also be part of the provision. Though most copyright owners are 
tolerant of such works, some are hostile and actively try to suppress them.124 
¶47  Provisions like those suggested above trade off narrowness for clarity, and it may be 
that such restrictions would stifle creativity by coercing creators to fit their content into 
 
119 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998). 
120 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). But see supra note 63. 
121 See Patrick McKay, Note, Culture of the Future: Adapting Copyright Law to Accommodate Fan-
Made Derivative Works in the Twenty-First Century, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 117, 141 (2012). 
122 Fan fiction is any written work made by fans based upon the original work's characters, setting, or 
both, usually made for public view on the Internet in a noncommercial manner.  
123 Fan art is any image created by fans based upon the original work's characters, setting, or both, 
usually made for public view on the Internet in a noncommercial manner. However, there are a substantial 
number of artists that accept commissions for fan art in return for financial compensation.  
124 Meredith McCardle, Note, Fan Fiction, Fandom, and Fanfare: What's All the Fuss?, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 433, 449-50 (2003). 
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narrow categories. Therefore, a solution that would allow for much greater inclusion would 
be to adopt the Canadian copyright exception for user-generated content as a fair use 
standard.125 However, the statute could still be broad enough for copyright owners to argue 
in good faith that content meant to fall within the exception does not in fact do so. 
Refinements would be necessary for this statute to be seriously considered, e.g. an 
enumerated list of specific categories that fall outside the exclusive rights of a copyright 
owner (as is the norm in most countries outside the United States).126 Such refinements 
would also benefit users who are not trained or cannot find those trained in copyright law, 
as it would be easier for them to know whether their content is infringing. Whichever 
approach is taken, the proposed provisions would help illuminate the contours of the fair 
use doctrine, allowing for greater clarity in determining whether a work is infringing, and 
thus potentially reducing erroneous takedown notices without benefiting actual infringers. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
¶48  The current OCILLA takedown process presents an opportunity for abuse, especially 
when coupled with the uncertainty that the fact-based nature of fair use determination 
produces. With no easy way to determine fair use in most situations, copyright owners can 
eradicate almost any work that appropriates their copyrighted material, even if it actually 
falls under fair use. The current scheme discourages the users that post allegedly infringing 
work from fighting back, encouraging them to err on the side of caution and setting a very 
high bar to prevail in a suit against the copyright owner for lacking an adequate good faith 
basis for the takedown notice. 
¶49  Many of the solutions proposed by others attempt to rectify this situation by tipping 
the scales in favor of the users. However, most do so by weakening the ability copyright 
that owners have to fight against infringers (who are still a widely pervasive problem in 
the Internet today). This cuts against the intent of Congress in passing the act in the first 
place and, given the recent attempts to pass stronger legislation, would find little to no 
support at this time. 
¶50  The better solution to the takedown abuse problem is with the establishment of safe 
harbor provisions, introducing bright line rules that, while narrow in scope, allow some 
users to protect their works by creating content with the provisions in mind or by altering 
their content to fit within the safe harbor statute. The benefit to copyright providers is that 
it would not cause any deprivation in going after actually infringing material. Therefore, 
this solution would preserve the spirit and purpose of OCILLA while giving greater clarity 
to the indefinite nature of fair use.
  
 
125 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 29.21(1), amended by S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.). 
126 See, e.g., Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 40-47J (Austl.); Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 89; 
Copyright Act 1994 §§ 41-92E (N.Z.). 
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